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 1. Introduction. 
 
There is now an extensive literature on international environmental agreements (see 
Barrett (2002) and Finus (2001) for excellent recent books summarising this 
literature). Yet, with a few exceptions discussed below, this literature works with 
simple static models of pollution despite the fact that many of the important problems 
(climate change, ozone depletion, acid rain) on which this literature seeks to shed 
light involve stock pollutants. In this paper we introduce a simple infinite-horizon 
model of a stock pollutant in which membership of an IEA changes over time as the 
stock of pollution varies.  
 
There are a small number of papers which consider the formation of IEAs to deal with 
a stock pollutant. Rubio and Casino (2001) use the concept of self-enforcing IEAs 
familiar from the work of Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994) but extend 
these models to allow for a stock pollutant. It is well-know that the static model 
generates pessimistic results, in which when a large number of countries join an IEA, 
the gains from the IEA are small. As in the static model, the dynamic model is 
analysed as a two-stage game. Countries first of all decide whether or not to join an 
IEA. Then countries choose their paths of emissions. These emission paths are 
calculated by solving a differential game in either open-loop or feedback strategies 
assuming that the IEA signatories act to maximise their joint welfare while non-
signatories just maximise individual welfare. Having solved for the emission paths 
and hence evaluated payoffs to signatories and non-signatories, Rubio and Casino 
then ask how many countries will want to join the IEA, using the same kind of 
stability analysis as in the static model. But in this model the dynamics of the stock 
pollutant affect only emissions strategies, not IEA membership. Many of the attempts 
to model empirically how many countries might join an IEA to deal with climate 
change have the same feature that countries are assumed to make a once-for-all 
decision whether to join an IEA, with the dynamics of the stock pollutant affecting 
only emissions paths and hence present-value payoffs (see, e.g. Eyckmans (2001)). 
 
Germain, Toint, Tulkens and de Zeeuw [GTTZ] (2002) extend the framework of 
Chander and Tulkens (1995) to a dynamic model of a stock pollutant. As is now well   1
understood the Chander and Tulkens approach, based on core concepts, is able to 
obtain the more optimistic conclusion that the grand coalition will be formed, because 
they assume that if one country defects from the grand coalition all countries will 
revert to non-cooperative behaviour. This punishment is sufficiently severe to deter 
defections. By contrast the stability analysis of Barrett and others assumes that if one 
country leaves an IEA, the remaining members will act to optimise their joint 
interests. With asymmetric countries it is necessary to use income transfers to ensure 
the stability of the grand coalition. In an important paper, GTTZ (2002) extend this 
analysis by showing that it is possible to devise dynamic transfers to ensure stability 
of the grand coalition when there is a stock pollutant. The membership of the grand 
coalition is thus maintained over time, although, importantly, in this case this is 
achieved by appropriate design of the transfers, rather than just by assuming that 
membership decisions are taken once-and-for-all. 
 
Both Rubio and Casino and GTTZ analyse models in which an IEA operates over the 
whole life of a stock pollutant. Karp and Sacheti (1997) consider a two-period model 
of a stock pollutant but assume that an IEA will only form in one of the periods – 
either just in the first, because the IEA will fall apart at the end of one period, or in the 
second, because there may be substantial delays in forming an IEA. They then assess 
how the incentives to join an IEA
1 are affected by the dynamics of the stock pollutant, 
as well as by differences in the extent to which the pollutant is local or global and the 
extent to which planners discount the future. In Karp and Sacheti membership of the 
IEA varies sharply over time, but in a way that is exogenously imposed. 
 
In an earlier paper (Rubio and Ulph (2002)) we extended the model of self-enforcing 
IEAs found in Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994) to a two-period model of 
a stock pollutant. We studied two ways in which IEA membership might be decided. 
In the fixed membership model we followed Rubio and Casino and assumed that 
countries made a once-for-all decision at the outset whether or not to join an IEA. In 
the  variable  membership model we assumed that countries decided each period 
whether or not to join an IEA. We showed that in the variable membership case the 
                                                 
1 They also use a rather different approach to modeling an IEA as a “modest” perturbation on a non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium.   2
number of countries would rise over time, and that for a wide range of parameter 
values, variable membership gave higher global welfare than fixed membership. So 
allowing membership to vary over time matters. In one version of the variable 
membership model there was an extreme case of the rising membership model in 
which no country would join in the first period, but some countries would join in the 
second period. This provided an explanation for one of the patterns of membership 
imposed exogenously by Karp and Sacheti. 
 
However, the two-period model has the undesirable characteristic that, even if  unit 
damage costs are an increasing function of the stock of pollution, emissions generated 
in the second period are less damaging than emissions generated in the first period 
simply because their effects are felt for a shorter time horizon. It was this which drove 
the result that membership would rise over time. In this paper we extend the model of 
Rubio and Ulph (2002) to an infinite-horizon model, but we consider only the variable 
IEA membership case. The model retains a number of the special simplifying features 
of Rubio and Ulph (2002), in particular the assumption that countries are identical and 
that in each period countries have to make a discrete choice of emissions (pollute or 
abate). We first analyse the outcomes when all countries act non-co-operatively and 
when all countries act cooperatively. We then analyse IEAs where membership varies 
over time. We show that there exists a steady-state stock of pollution, which lies 
between the cooperative and non-cooperative steady-states, with a corresponding 
steady-state IEA membership. We show that membership is a decreasing function of 
the stock of pollution, so that if the initial stock of pollution lies below (above) the 
steady-state, then the membership will decline (rise) as the stock moves towards 
steady-state. The crucial parameters in this model are those which determine the level 
of unit damage costs and how quickly these costs rise with the stock of pollution. We 
show that as these parameters increase, both the initial and steady-state memberships 
decline, until, in the limit, membership is 2 in every time period. So for high values of 
these parameters membership dynamics disappear. Not surprisingly, it is for these 
parameter values that the potential gains from cooperation are greatest. These results 
are just the dynamic generalisation of the pessimistic static results. 
   3
2. The Model 
 
There are N identical countries. Consider a typical period (we ignore time subscripts).  
Each country can choose a level of emissions q = 0,1, which we interpret to mean it 
can either abate or pollute. The total of emissions by all other countries is denoted by 
Q, so total emissions in the period are q + Q. Suppose at the start of the period the 
cumulative stock of emissions is z. Then the cumulative stock of emissions at the start 
of the next period is  Q q z + + ρ  where ρ   ( 1 0 < < ρ ) is the decay factor per period. 
We denote the initial stock of emissions by  0 0 ≥ z . 
 
If a country pollutes in the period it derives a unit of benefit which we shall normalise 
to1 and assume is constant over time. On the other hand, each unit of the stock of 
pollution at the start of the period generates for each country a unit of damage costs, 
) (z γ , which is a strictly increasing function of the stock of pollution at the start of the 
period. Thus the flow of net benefits to a country in the period is given by: 
z z q z Q q ) ( ) , , ( γ π − = . Finally, the discount factor per period is  ) 1 0 ( , < < δ δ . 
 
In the rest of this section we consider what happens when all countries act non-
cooperatively, and when all countries act cooperatively. In the next section we analyse 
international environmental agreements. 
 
2.1 Non-Cooperative  Equilibrium. 
 
Let U(z) be the present value of current and all future net benefits to a country when 
the stock of emissions at the start of the current period is z and in each period each 
country selects its optimal non-cooperative emission strategy. Then, in the current 
period a typical country takes as given the total emissions of all other countries, Q, 
and chooses its emission strategy q =0, 1 to maximise present value payoff:  
 
        ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ( ) , , ( Q q z U z z q Q q z U z Q q z Q q + + + − = + + + = Π ρ δ γ ρ δ π . 
 
Then it is straightforward to see that, for given Q  and  z,  it pays a country to pollute 
if    4
 
       )] 1 ( ) ( [ 1 + + − + ≥ Q z U Q z U ρ ρ δ                                      (1) 
 
We shall show shortly that U(z) is a strictly decreasing and concave function of z. So 
(1) has the usual interpretation that it will pay a country to pollute if the instantaneous 
gain to it from a unit of emissions is greater than the reduction in present value future 
net benefits it will suffer from a unit increase in the stock of emissions. Given the 
properties of U(z) a sufficient condition for each country to  pollute no matter what 
decisions other countries make is that (1) holds for N-1. We shall show shortly that, 
with Q = N – 1, as  ∞ → z , (1) cannot hold. However, we shall shortly make an 
assumption on parameter values, Assumption A, which ensures that (1) holds for Q = 
N - 1 and  z z ≤ ≤ 0 , where  z  is an upper bound on the stock of emissions sufficiently 
large that the stock of emissions never reaches  z . It then follows trivially that: 
 
Claim 1.  Given Assumption A, for all relevant values of z, namely,  z z ≤ ≤ 0 the 
optimal non-cooperative strategy is for every country to pollute in every period. 
 
Then, the value function U is defined by the recursive equation: 
 
  ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( N z U z z z U + + − = ρ δ γ .                            (2) 
 
Define  z ~  as the steady-state stock of pollution when countries act non-cooperatively. 
Then 
ρ −
=
1
~ N
z , and, as we shall show in Assumption A,  z z < ~ . From (2) we derive: 
  
δ
γ
−
−
=
1
~ ) ~ ( 1
) ~ (
z z
z U  
so we can characterise the value function in steady-state, and clearly  0 ) ~ ( < ′ z U , so 
the value function must be decreasing in z when the stock of emissions reaches its 
steady-state value. Moreover it is clear that if  z z ~ ) ( 0 > < , then the stock will rise (fall) 
monotonically to its steady-state value. 
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To make further progress, we shall consider particular functional forms so that we can 
derive the value function explicitly. We assume that  0 , 0 , ) ( > > + = µ λ µ λ γ z z  and  
that U(z) takes the form 
2 ) ( cz bz a z U − − = . Substituting in (2) we get: 
 
2 2 2
2 2
] [ ] 2 [ ] 1 [
] ) ( ) ( [ ) ( 1
z c z cN b cN bN a
N z c N z b a z z cz bz a
δρ µ δρ δρ λ δ δ δ
ρ ρ δ µ λ
+ − + + − − − + =
+ − + − + + − = − −
 
 
Thus U(z) is indeed quadratic, and equating coefficients we get: 
 
Result 1.  For the infinite horizon non-cooperative equilibrium with unit damage cost 
z z µ λ γ + = ) ( , the value function takes the form 
2 ) ( cz bz a z U − − =  where: 
δ
δ δ
δρ
δρ λ
δρ
µ
−
− −
= >
−
+
= >
−
=
1
] 1 [
; 0
) 1 (
2
; 0
1
2
2
c N Nb
a
Nc
b c  
 
Thus  0 ) ( , 0 ) ( < ′′ < ′ z U z U . Finally, using the specific functional forms, we can 
rewrite (1) as: 
 
   )] 1 ( 2 [ 1 − + + + ≥ N z c c b ρ δ                                (1’) 
As noted earlier, it is straightforward to see that, since c > 0, the RHS of (1’) increases 
linearly in z, and so must fail to hold for large enough values of z. We define 
ρ
φ φ
−
= =
1
~ N
z z  where φ  > max [1, 
z
z
~
0 ] . If we ensure that condition (1’) holds for 
z , then in the non-cooperative model it will always pay countries to pollute, since, by 
definition of z  and the dynamics of the non-cooperative model, the stock of 
emissions can never lie above  z . Substituting for values of b, c  and  defining:   
1
) 1 (
1
) 1 (
,
1
;
1
2 >
−
+
−
≡
−
≡
−
≡
δρ ρ
φρ
ϕ
δρ
δ
ζ
δρ
δ
ϑ  
 
Assumption A  For the infinite horizon non-cooperative equilibrium with unit 
damage cost  z z µ λ γ + = ) ( , we assume that  parameters  satisfy the condition: 
   µ ϕ ζ ϑ λ ) 1 2 ( 1 − + ≥ N                                      (A1) 
   6
To summarise, in the non-cooperative equilibrium with unit damage costs  z µ λ + , 
where  µ λ ,  satisfy Assumption A, the optimal non-cooperative strategy is for all 
countries to pollute in all periods. Starting from the initial stock of emissions,  , 0 z the 
stock will rise (fall) monotonically to the steady-state value z ~  assuming that 
z z ~ ) ( 0 > < . The present value of net benefits for each country is given by 
2
0 0 0) ( cz bz a z U − − =  where a, b, c are given in Result 1. 
 
2.2 Cooperative  Equilibrium 
 
Now suppose that all countries cooperate and let V(z) be the present value of current 
and future net benefits each country will receive if the stock of emissions at the start 
of the current period is z and in each period the countries collectively choose their 
optimal cooperative strategy. To determine this optimal strategy, suppose total current 
emissions of all other countries is Q. Then the optimal current period strategy for a 
particular country to maximise collective present value of current and future net 
benefits will be to abate if: 
 
)] 1 ( ) ( [ 1 + + − + ≤ Q z V Q z V N ρ ρ δ                            (3) 
 
We shall show shortly that V’ < 0, so (3) has the obvious interpretation that it will be 
optimal for a country to abate if the current benefit it derives from emitting a unit of 
pollution is less than the present value loss imposed on all countries by increasing the 
stock of emissions by one unit. We shall show shortly, that provided parameters 
satisfy Assumption B, then (3) holds for all Q > 0,  z z ≤ ≤ 0 . Then we get, trivially,  
 
Claim 2 For all values of z,  z z ≤ ≤ 0 , the optimal cooperative strategy is for all 
countries to abate pollution in each period. 
 
Given this optimal strategy, it is clear that the stock of emissions will decline to its 
steady-state value, 0, and that the value function is given by the recursive relation: 
 
   ) ( ) ( ) ( z V z z z V ρ δ γ + − =     (4)   7
 
To get further we again assume the specific functional form for the unit damage cost 
z z µ λ γ + = ) ( , and that the value function takes the quadratic form 
2 ) ( z z z V χ β α − − = .  Then (4) becomes: 
 
2 2 2 ) ( z z z z z z δχρ δβρ δα µ λ χ β α − − + + − = − −  
 
Thus the value function is indeed quadratic, and equating coefficients we have: 
 
Result 2  For the infinite-horizon cooperative equilibrium with unit damage cost 
z z µ λ γ + = ) (  the value function takes the form 
2 z z χ β α − − where 
2 1
,
1
, 0
δρ
µ
χ
δρ
λ
β α
−
=
−
= = . 
 
For these specific functional forms (3) becomes: 
   )] ( 2 [ 1 Q z N + + + ≤ ρ χ χ β δ    (3’) 
For this inequality to hold for all non-negative Q and z it is sufficient that it holds for 
Q = z = 0. Substituting for  χ β , we need the following assumption on parameters to 
guarantee that (3’) is satisfied.  
 
Assumption B.  For the cooperative equilibrium with unit damage cost 
µ λ µ λ , , z + , satisfy the condition: 
   ζµ ϑ λ N N + ≤ 1                                        (A2) 
To summarise, in the cooperative equilibrium with unit damage costs  z µ λ + , where 
µ λ ,  satisfy Assumption B, the optimal cooperative strategy is for all countries to 
abate in all periods. Starting from initial stock of emissions,  , 0 z the stock will fall 
monotonically to the steady-state value 0. The present value of net benefits for each 
country is given by 
2
0 0 0) ( z z z V χ β α − − =  where   χ β α , , are given in Result 2. 
 
Finally, to ensure that the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria have the 
properties set out above, we need to check that we can find parameter values that 
satisfy both Assumptions A and B, i.e.  ζµ ϑ λ µ ϕ ζ ϑ λ N N N + ≤ ≤ − + 1 ) 1 2 ( . It is   8
straightforward to see that if 
) 1 2 (
1
0 ; 1
1
−
−
< < < <
ϕ ζ
ϑ λ
µ ϑγ
N N
 then both 
Assumptions A and B are satisfied. For future reference, the way we shall select 
parameters  µ λ , is to select  2 1,θ θ  as any two numbers lying strictly between 0 and 1. 
Then we set: 
  ) ( ;
) 1 2 (
1
) ( ];
1
[
1
1 2 1
1
1 θ µ θ µ
ϕ ζ
ϑλ
θ µ
θ
θ
ϑ
λ =
−
−
≡
−
+ =
N N
        (A3) 
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3. International Environmental Agreements with Dynamic Membership 
 
We now consider the formation of a sequence of International Environmental 
Agreements (IEAs), in which, in each period, countries are free to join or leave an 
IEA. The model of IEA formation in each period is a dynamic version of the model of 
self-enforcing or stable IEAs introduced in the work of Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) 
and  Barrett (1994), and well surveyed in Finus (2001). The model can be viewed as a 
two-stage game, in which countries first decide whether or not to join an IEA and then 
determine their emissions. In the second-stage emission game, non-signatory 
countries (whom we denote by the symbol f to mean free-rider or fringe country) 
choose emissions in a non-cooperative fashion similar to section 2.1; signatory 
countries (whom we denote by the symbol s) act in a cooperative fashion similar to 
2.2, choosing emissions to maximise the total net benefits of all signatory countries, 
taking as given the behaviour of non-signatories. In the first-stage membership game 
we look for a stable IEA in which no individual signatory country would wish to 
switch to be a non-signatory, and no non-signatory would wish to switch to being a 
signatory. This is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium of the membership game. Before 
getting into detailed analysis we make three general remarks about our modelling 
strategy. 
 
Firstly, the key difference between our model and the work of Barrett, Carraro and 
Sinsicalco et al is that we allow the membership to vary over time as the stock of 
emissions varies. Following Rubio and Ulph (2002), in which we analyse a two-
period version of this model, we call this a variable membership model. As we noted 
in the introduction, this contrasts with the way in which IEAs for a stock pollutant are 
modelled by, for example, Rubio and Casino (2001) where it is assumed that 
countries make a once-for-all decision at the outset whether or not to join an IEA. In 
Rubio and Ulph (2002) we called this a fixed membership model, and for the two-
period model we were able to contrast the outcomes with fixed and variable 
membership models. In this paper we consider only the variable membership model.  
 
Secondly, we shall show that the optimal strategy for signatories in each period is to 
abate pollution. However, we do not provide any analysis of why signatories find it in 
their interests to abide by this strategy rather than free-ride. Rather, like much of the   10
work on stable IEAs, the analysis of the stability of IEA membership is conducted 
independently of any analysis of why signatories abide by their agreement. Since the 
analysis of commitment by IEA signatories usually rests on repeated game arguments, 
(see, for example Barrett (1997)) it can be argued that the failure to use the dynamic 
nature of our model to analyse both what determines the stable size of IEA each 
period and what makes countries stick to their agreements is a serious limitation of 
our analysis. We recognise this issue and hope to rectify it in future research.  
 
Thirdly, since we have assumed all countries are identical all we can determine is the 
size of the stable IEA in each period. We cannot say which countries become 
signatories in any period. This leads to an important modelling assumption. For in 
conducting stability analysis we need to be able to assess how a decision by a country 
to change its status in one period (i.e. to switch from being a signatory to a non-
signatory or vice versa) affects its payoff not just in that current period but in future 
periods. The way a status change affects a country’s future net benefits depends on 
two issues. First, a change of status in the current period will affect the stock of 
emissions in future periods, which will in turn affect the size of future IEA 
membership. We will take account of this through the dependency of the value 
function and the size of IEA membership on the stock of pollution. Second, future net 
benefits will also depend on whether the country contemplating a change of status in 
the current period will be a signatory or not in future periods. But, as just noted, we 
have no way of determining which countries will be signatories or non-signatories. To 
get round this, we shall assume that each country believes that in each period there is 
a random process for determining which countries become signatories, such that the 
probability of any country being a signatory in that period is simply the size of the 
stable IEA in that period divided by the total number of countries. This probability of 
being a signatory is clearly the same for all countries, and is independent of whether a 
country was a signatory or non-signatory in previous periods. Since the size of 
membership varies over time, obviously the probability of being a signatory in any 
period varies over time. So each country has the same expected present value of future 
net benefits, which will depend on the stock of emissions at the start of next period. 
This corresponds to what, in Rubio and Ulph (2002), we called the Random 
Assignment Rule. Of course a more realistic treatment might be to assume that current 
status has an important impact on future status, and in the two-period model of Rubio   11
and Ulph (2002) we contrasted the outcome using the Random Assignment Rule with 
an alternative model (the Status Quo Assignment Rule) in which current status is an 
important determinant of future status. However, while that is tractable in a two-
period model, it becomes much harder to analyse in an infinite horizon model.  
 
With this preamble, we define W(z) as the expected present value of current and future 
net benefits to a country when (i) the stock of emissions at the start of the current 
period is z; (ii) in each period the size of membership of an IEA is that which 
constitutes a unique stable IEA for that period; (iii) in each period, signatories and 
non-signatories choose their optimal emission strategies; and (iv) in each period there 
is a random process for determining which countries become signatories, with each 
country having an equal probability of being a signatory.  We now turn to the analysis 
of the second stage emission game and then the analysis of the stable IEA. 
 
3.1 Second-stage Emission Game 
 
Suppose that in a period with initial stock of emissions z, the outcome of the first-
stage membership game is that there are n signatories to an IEA. We now need to 
derive the optimal emission strategies for non-signatories and signatories. 
 
Non-Signatories 
 
For a typical non-signatory country, suppose the total of current emissions of all other 
countries is Q. Then it will pay that non-signatory to pollute if 
 
         )] 1 ( ) ( [ 1 + + − + ≥ Q z W Q z W ρ ρ δ                                      (5) 
Not surprisingly this has the same form and interpretation as (1), except that there is a 
different value function. 
 
Signatories 
 
A typical signatory country will choose its emissions so as to maximise the total net 
benefits of the n signatories, recognising that all non-signatories will pollute.   12
Assuming all other signatories abate, it will pay any one signatory country to abate as 
long as: 
 
  ) , ( )] 1 ( ) ( [ 1 z n n N z W n N z W n ω ρ ρ δ ≡ + − + − − + ≤            (6) 
 
Again, not surprisingly, (6) has the same form and interpretation as (3) except that 
there are only n countries who cooperate and there is a different value function. 
 
We need to say more about the properties of  ) , ( z n ω . Clearly  ) , 0 ( z ω = 0. By 
comparing (5) and (6) it is readily seen that  1 ) , 1 ( < z ω . It will be useful to 
approximate  ) ( ) , ( n N z W n z n − + ′ − = ρ δ ω . Then we have:  W n W n ′′ + ′ − = δ δ ω ; 
W n z ′′ − = δρ ω . We shall show later that  0 , 0 < ′′ < ′ W W . So  0 > z ω . We assume that  
W ′′  is sufficiently small that  0 > n ω .  
 
Define  ) (z n as the value of n for which  . 1 ) ), ( ( = z z n ω  Totally differentiating we 
obtain:   0 < − =
n
z
dz
dn
ω
ω
. Hence: 
 
Lemma 1 For any z there is a unique positive value of n(z) > 1; moreover n(z) is a 
decreasing  function of z. 
 
Define m(z) as the smallest integer no less than n(z). Clearly  m(z) ≥  2. m(z) is the 
critical minimum size of IEA membership at which it just pays signatories to abate 
pollution. Then we have: 
 
Result 3  
(i) For all  ) (z m n ≥ , the optimal strategies are for non-signatories to pollute and 
signatories to abate, and the resulting payoffs to signatories and non-signatories are: 
  1 ) , ( ) , ( ); ( ) ( ) , ( + = − + + − = z n W z n W n N z W z z z n W
s f s ρ δ γ  
(ii) For all n < m(z), the optimal strategies are for both  non-signatories and 
signatories to pollute and the payoffs to signatories and non-signatories are: 
  ) ( ) ( 1 ) , ( ) , ( N z W z z z n W z n W
f s + + − = = ρ δ γ    13
 
Thus Result 3 tells us for any n, z what the optimal emission strategies and payoffs are 
for signatories and non-signatories. We can now go back to the first-stage game and 
determine the size of membership which constitutes a stable IEA. 
 
3.2 First-stage Membership Game 
 
In a period with initial stock of emissions z we define an IEA of size n ˆ  as stable if it 
satisfies the 2 properties: 
 
Internal Stability 
   ) , 1 ˆ ( ) , ˆ ( z n W z n W
f s − ≥  
so no signatory has any incentive switch to being a non-signatory. 
 
External Stability 
   ) , 1 ˆ ( ) , ˆ ( z n W z n W
s f + >  
so no non-signatory has any incentive to switch to being a signatory. 
Then we have: 
 
Result 4  If the initial emissions at the start of a period is z, then the unique stable 
IEA in that period has membership m(z). 
 
Proof: 
We first show that m(z) is stable.  
 
Internal Stability 
From the definition of internal stability and Result 3 we require: 
)] ( )) ( ( [ 1
) ( ) ( 1 )) ( ( ) (
N z W z m N z W
N z W z z z m N z W z z
+ − − + ≤ ⇔
+ + − ≥ − + + −
ρ ρ δ
ρ δ γ ρ δ γ
 
From the definition of m(z) 
)] 1 ) ( ( )) ( ( )[ ( 1 + − + − − + ≤ z m N z W z m N z W z m ρ ρ δ  
But if  0 , 0 < ′′ < ′ W W  then  0 , )] ( ) ( [ )] 1 ( ) ( [ > ∀ + − < + − y X y X W X W X W X W y  
So internal stability is satisfied.    14
 
External Stability  
From the definition of external stability and Result 3 we require: 
))] ( ( ) 1 ) ( ( [ 1
) 1 ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( 1
z m N z W z m N z W
z m N z W z z z m N z W z z
− + − − − + > ⇔
− − + + − > − + + −
ρ ρ δ
ρ δ γ ρ δ γ
 
 which is satisfied by (5). 
 
Finally, proof of the External Stability condition shows that no n > m(z) can be 
internally stable. The fact that, from Result 3, for all n < m(z) payoffs to signatories 
and non-signatories are identical and independent of n means that no n < m(z) is 
externally stable.  QED 
 
The intuition is simply that, as long as countries know that current membership is 
strictly greater than m(z) then defection by one country will mean that remaining 
signatories will continue to abate, so the incentive to defect is exactly the same as the 
incentive for a non-signatory to pollute. So it must pay a country to leave any IEA 
larger than m(z). But once membership has reached m(z) any further defection by a 
single country would cause remaining signatories to pollute, and, by the definition of 
m(z), the cost of this outweighs any gain a single IEA member country would get 
from defecting and polluting. Finally for membership below m(z) countries are 
indifferent between joining or not joining, and our definition of external stability  is 
that if they are indifferent they will join. 
 
Now that we have derived the size of the stable IEA and the optimal strategies for 
signatories and non-signatories, we can determine the payoffs to signatory and non-
signatory countries at the start of a period in which the initial stock of emissions is z 
as follows: 
 1 ) ( ) ( )); ( ( ) ( ) ( + = − + + − = z W z W z m N z W z z z W
s f s ρ δ γ  
Then assuming that each country has the same probability m(z)/N of being selected as 
a signatory, the expected present-value of current and future net benefits when the 
initial stock of emissions is given by:   15
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       (7) 
We can also define the steady-state stock of emissions by:  z
z m N
z ~
1
) ˆ ( ˆ <
−
−
=
ρ
. We 
define ) ( 0 0 z m m ≡  as the initial membership and  ) ˆ ( ˆ z m m ≡  as the steady-state 
membership. But we know from Lemma 1 that if the stock is rising, then membership 
must be falling.  
 
Note that the result that the size of membership of the stable IEA falls as the stock of 
pollution rises is just the dynamic version of the result in Barrett (1994) that as 
damage costs rise (relative to the benefits of emissions) so the gains from cooperation 
rise, but conversely the number of countries joining the IEA falls. In Barrett’s case 
that was a comparative statics result across different pollution problems. In our model 
it occurs endogenously as the accumulation of pollution drives up damage costs. The 
intuition for why this result occurs is that, as we have noted, free-riding means that 
the size of the stable IEA is the minimum size of IEA at which it just pays IEA 
members to abate pollution; as the damage costs from pollution rise, the minimum 
size of IEA at which it pays signatories to abate falls. 
 
3.3 Particular Functional Forms 
 
In order to be able to use (7) to solve explicitly for the value function W, we again 
resort to special functional forms, though in this case, as we shall see, we shall need to 
make a number of approximations. So again we assume that  z z µ λ γ + = ) ( and 
suppose that we can approximate W by the quadratic function 
2 ) ( Cz Bz A z W − − = .  
 
Then the condition for determining n(z) becomes: 
 
  2 )) ( ( 2 ] 2 2 ) ( )[ (
))] ( ( 2 ) )[( ( 1
z n C Cz CN C B z n
z n N z C C B z n
δ δρ δ δ
ρ δ
− + + + =
− + + + =
            (8) 
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Define:  ) ( 8 ) ( ; ) ( ; 2 ; 2 ) (
2 z C z z z C CN C B ξ δ ξ ψ σ τ ξ δρ σ δ δ τ < − ≡ + ≡ ≡ + + ≡ . 
Then we can solve (8) to get
2: 
  0 2 ) ( ; 0 ) 1 (
4
) ( ;
4
) ( ) (
) (
3 2 > = ′′ < − = ′ −
=
− ψ σ
ψ
ξ
δ
σ
δ
ψ ξ
z n
C
z n
C
z z
z n .    (9) 
 
The first approximation we make is to ignore the fact that membership must be an 
integer and work with n(z) not m(z). Then steady-state membership is defined as : 
  
ρ −
−
≅
1
) ˆ ( ˆ z n N
z                                               (10) 
Straightforward manipulations allow us to solve (10), which is quadratic, to yield: 
 
  
υ
υη ω ω
2
4
ˆ
2 + +
= z                                     (11) 
where:  
 
)}; ( ) 1 ( 2 { ; ) 1 ( 2 C B C N C + − − ≡ − ≡ δ ρ δ ω δ ρ υ  
} 1 ) ( { − + ≡ C B Nδ η >0.                                                (12) 
 
Since η, υ > 0, we have chosen the upper root of the quadratic in (10) to ensure that 
z ˆ > 0. This also ensures that  z ˆ is unique.  
 
The second approximation we make is to approximate n(z) by a quadratic expression: 
2 ) ( hz gz f z n + − ≡  where f, g, h are all positive. We choose f, g h so as to fit  ) (z n  to 
n(z) as follows:   n z n z n n z n z n n z n z n ′ ≡ ′ = ′ ≡ = ≡ = ˆ ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ; ˆ ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ; ) ( ) ( 0 0 0 <0; i.e. the 
value of n  should coincide with the true value at the initial stock,  0 z , and at steady-
state stock,  z ˆ ; moreover the slope of n should coincide with the true slope at steady-
state. The values of f, g, h which satisfy these requirements are: 
     0 ˆ ˆ 2 ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ; 0
) ˆ (
) ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ( 2
2
0
0 0 > ′ − = + ′ − = >
−
− ′ + −
= n z h g z h z n n f
z z
z z n n n
h                     (13) 
                                                 
2 It is straightforward to see that (8) has two positive roots. We take the lower root because the upper 
root lies above N  as long as  1 ) ( > + C B Nδ , which is a necessary condition for (6) to hold.   17
Note that by the properties of n(z) given in (9), 
0
0
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ 0
z z
n n
n
−
−
< ′ − < , guaranteeing that h 
is indeed positive. 
 
We can now rewrite (7) as: 
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Substituting for X, collecting terms which have the same power of z, but ignoring 
terms which involve higher than quadratic powers of z (our third approximation) and 
equating the remaining coefficients yields: 
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δ ρ δ δ µ
ρ δ ρ δ λ
δ δ δ
            (14) 
 
Note that (14) is not a simple set of linear equations in A, B, C which can be solved in 
the way we did in section 2, because f, g, h are complicated non-linear functions of A, 
B, C through (9), (11), (12) and (13).  
 
To make progress, we have resorted to numerical methods to solve (14). Starting from 
some initial set of values for A, B, C (which we take to be A = a, B = b, C = c, i.e. we 
start from the non-cooperative value function), we use (9) to solve for  ) ( 0 0 z n n = . 
Then from (11) and (12) we solve for  z ˆ , and from (9) we solve for 
) ˆ ( ˆ ), ˆ ( ˆ z n n z n n ′ = ′ = . This allows us to use (13) to solve for f, g, h. Finally we use (14)   18
to determine a new set of values for A, B, C. We iterate until differences between old 
and new values of A, B, C are negligible. We report the results in the next section. 
 
3.4 Dynamics of the Stock and Membership.  
 
To complete the description of the model with dynamic IEA membership, we describe 
how the stock of the pollutant, and hence membership, changes over time. The 
equation of motion for the stock is: 
   ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 t t t t t t z n N z z m N z z z − + − − ≅ − + − − = − + ρ ρ          (15) 
Now we know the following: (i) from (11) there is a unique steady-state stock,  z ˆ ; (ii) 
from (9) and footnote 3  n(z) < N  for all z ≥ 0; (iii)  0 ) ( < ′ t z n , but n(z) is bounded 
below by 1. So the relationship between N – n(z) and (1 – ρ)z is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
It is clear from Figure 1 that if  z z ˆ ) ( 0 > <  then the stock will steadily rise (fall) 
towards its steady state value and so membership will fall (rise) towards its steady-
state value.  Now the argument has been based on using n(z) rather than m(z) to 
denote membership, i.e. ignoring the fact that membership has to be an integer. This 
might lead to a situation where there is more than one steady-state membership and 
stock as shown in Figure 2.  
 
z
N-1 
z ) 1 ( ρ −
N – n(z)
z ˆ  19
 
Figure 2 
 
This suggests that if the initial stock is low (less than  ) ˆ1 z the model will converge to a 
lower steady-state stock and higher steady-state membership than if the initial stock is 
high (greater than  ) ˆ2 z . However the steady-state membership levels are unlikely to 
differ by more than 1. We comment further on this possibility in the next section 
when we report on the numerical results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
z ) 1 ( ρ −
N-m(z) 
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4. Some Numerical Results. 
 
We have conducted some numerical experiments for three reasons. First, we need to 
use numerical methods to solve for the value functions for the dynamic IEA 
membership model. Second, the numerical experiments allow us to compare the 
outcomes of the three different solutions, and in particular to say something about 
how many countries might join an IEA, how this might vary over time, and how much 
of the potential gains from cooperation might be delivered by dynamic IEAs. Finally, 
the numerical results allow us to say something more about the dynamics of the model 
and the possibility of there being more than one steady-state membership and stock 
level. 
 
We start by specifying the parameters of the model:  ρ δ , , N,  φ , 0 z , 2 1,θ θ  (and hence 
µ λ , ).  We have chosen parameters N = 50,  = = ρ δ ; 95 . 0 0.9. The discount factor 
and decay rate might seem quite low, but we have in mind that a period of time 
corresponds to a block of, say, 5 years. It turns out that the results are not very 
sensitive to these parameter values. We fix  0 z  =50 and  5 . 1 = φ , which implies 
. 750 = z  The key parameters are  2 1,θ θ  and hence  µ λ , . It turns out that if 
25 . 0 2 1 > = θ θ , then in the dynamic IEA model, membership is always low (2,3) and 
does not vary much over time. Obviously the gains from cooperation are small (< 
5%). To get more variation in outcomes it is necessary to choose smaller parameter 
values. So we have chosen values of  203 . 0 , 102 . 0 , 001 . 0 1 = θ ;  2 θ = 0.02, 0.14, 0.26. 
These give outcomes which span the range of sizes of IEA membership.  
 
 
 Having fixed parameter values, we now solve for the outcomes of the three models: 
non-cooperative, cooperative and dynamic IEA. For the non-cooperative model, we 
calculate directly the parameters of the value function, a, b, c, which allows us to 
calculate the present value of net benefits for a non-cooperative country  ) (
~
0 z U U ≡ . 
We then simulate the model to determine T
~, the time it takes for the stock of 
emissions to move from  0 z  to the steady-state value  z ~ . We do the same for 
cooperative model, computing the parameters  χ β , for the value function and hence   21
the present value benefits for a cooperative country  ) ( * 0 z V V = . We simulate the 
model to determine T*, the length of time it takes for the stock to decay to 0. Finally, 
for the dynamic IEA model, we first solve numerically the parameters of the value 
function A, B, C as described in the previous section. This allows us to compute the 
steady-state stock level z ˆ , the corresponding steady-state membership and the present 
value of net benefits  ). ( ˆ
0 z W W ≡ Again we simulate the model, but using the actual 
function  n(z) computed from the equilibrium parameters A, B, C rather than the 
quadratic approximation  ) (z n ; we also use the proper integer value for membership 
in each period, m(z). The simulation allows us to determine T ˆ , the time it takes the 
stock to reach steady-state. But it also allows us to compute directly the steady-state 
stock of pollution and steady-state membership, and to compare these with the values 
computed using the approximation. This provides some check on the reliability of the   
approximations. It also provides a check whether there might be multiple steady-
states, as discussed in the last section.   
 
In Table 1 for each of the nine pairs of values for  2 1,θ θ we present, for the non-
cooperative, cooperative and dynamic IEA models in turn, the parameters of the value 
functions, the steady state stock, the time to reach steady-state and the present value 
net benefits. For the dynamic IEA model we also present the initial and steady-state 
sizes of membership  m m ˆ , 0 . Finally we compute ΓF =  U V
~
*− , the absolute value of 
the full gains from cooperation (i.e. the difference in payoff per country between the 
cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria), and  )
~
* /( )
~ ˆ ( U V U W P − − ≡ Γ , the partial 
gain from moving from the non-cooperative model to the dynamic IEA model, as a 
proportion of the full gains in cooperation. ΓP is a measure of how successful IEAs 
might be.  
 
The results show that, as cost parameters increase, the parameters of the value 
functions also increase (in absolute size) reflecting the fact that welfare falls as costs 
increase. The coefficients of z and z
2 are quite similar across the three cases: non-
cooperative, cooperative and dynamic IEA. For the non-cooperative and cooperative 
models, steady-state stocks and the time to reach steady-state are independent of cost 
parameters, as we would expect, but for the dynamic IEA model, steady-state stock   22
increases with cost parameters, although the time to reach steady-state is almost 
independent of costs. 
 
Membership of IEAs falls as cost parameters rise, while the absolute (full) gains to 
cooperation rise. The (relative) partial gains to cooperation decline. These results are 
consistent with the well-known results of the static model (see Barrett (1994)) that 
IEA membership is greatest when gains to cooperation are lowest. In terms of 
dynamics of IEA membership, since we have chosen low values of initial stock, 
membership declines over time as the stock rises to steady-state, but as cost 
parameters rise membership becomes almost constant over time. So where cost 
parameters keep membership low, allowing for it to change over time does not add 
very much. So dynamics matter most when IEAs matter least. 
 
Finally turning to dynamics, in all but the second case, the steady-state membership 
given by simulating the model was identical to the steady-state membership computed 
directly using the approximations, with corresponding steady-state stocks being 
within 2% of each other. But in the second case the simulations produced a steady-
state membership of 9 while the steady-state membership computed directly was only 
8, with the steady-state stock being 420 rather than 410. We interpret this as an 
example of the possibility of multiple steady-states because of the integer nature of 
membership. But the differences between the steady-states are not large.   23
5. Conclusions. 
 
In this paper we have extended the familiar model of self-enforcing IEAs from the 
usual setting of a static pollution problem to a dynamic setting of a stock pollutant. 
Unlike previous models, which assumed that countries make a once-for-all decision at 
the outset whether or not to join an IEA, we have explored the implications of 
allowing IEA membership to vary over time as the stock of pollution changes. We 
have shown that there will exist a steady-state stock of pollution (usually unique) and 
corresponding steady-state IEA membership, and that if the initial stock of pollution 
is below (above) the steady-state then the stock will rise (fall) steadily towards steady-
state, and IEA membership will fall (rise) towards steady-state. The intuition behind 
these results is that they are simply the dynamic generalisation of the pessimistic 
static results that the greater are the costs of damage, and hence the greater the 
potential gains from cooperation, the smaller is the size of a self-enforcing IEA.  
 
The model is extremely simple and there are many possible lines for further research. 
One obvious question is how global welfare in this variable membership model would 
compare with global welfare in a fixed membership model. In our earlier two-period 
model we found that the variable membership model generally gave higher welfare 
than the fixed membership model. But in the two-period setting variable IEA 
membership rose over time and it would be interesting to know whether the welfare 
ranking of the two types of model would carry over to the infinite-horizon case. The 
model has also substantially simplified the emission choices for countries, and it 
would be interesting to know how our results would change if countries had a 
continuous choice of emissions.  
 
Because of our assumption of symmetry, while we can determine how many countries 
might join an IEA at any date, we cannot determine which countries might join. So 
our modelling of the variable membership model of the IEA required us to specify 
what beliefs countries formed about whether or not they would be a signatory in 
future periods, and we have invoked a very simple assumption that each country 
believes that it has the same probability as any other country of being a signatory in a 
future period, independent of its past history of membership. This is clearly 
unsatisfactory and it would be desirable to either drop the symmetry assumption, and   24
so try to determine which countries are likely to join in each period, or provide a 
proper justification for our assumption, and if that is not possible determine what 
might be a more appropriate assumption to make about beliefs.  
 
Finally the model of self-enforcing agreements is itself a special model, and there are 
now a range of competing models of coalition stability (see Bloch (1997) and Finus 
(2001) for excellent surveys). Some of these models involve the concept of sequential 
formation of coalitions (so they allow for the possibility of more than one IEA group 
of countries). However the underlying game is static, and the notion of sequential 
formation is a conceptual rather temporal one. It would be interesting to consider how 
far such concepts could be integrated with the underlying dynamics of the pollution 
problem to assess how coalition structures might evolve in real time.  
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TABLE 1:  RESULTS OF NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS 
1 θ   0.001 0.102 0.203 
2 θ   0.02 0.14 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.26 
Non-Cooperative 
a (×-1)  7.124 43.99 80.85 105.5 138.6 171.8 203.8 233.2 262.7 
b   0.028 0.064 0.100 0.132 0.164 0.196 0.235 0.264 0.292 
) 1000 (× c   0.010 0.071 0.131 0.009 0.064 0.118 0.008 0.056 0.105 
z ~   500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 
T
~  110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 
U
~
(×-1)  8.551 47.35 86.15 112.1 147.0 181.8 215.6 246.6 277.5 
Cooperative 
β   0.022 0.022 0.022 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.230 0.230 0.230 
) 1000 (× χ  0.010 0.071 0.131 0.009 0.064 0.118 0.008 0.056 0.105 
z*  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
T*  169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 
V* (×-1)  1.129 1.281 1.433 6.336 6.473 6.609 11.54 11.66 11.78 
IEA 
A (×-1)  0.508 31.59 68.51 92.19 125.8 160.1 193.2 223.3 254.0 
B  0.025 0.064 0.100 0.132 0.163 0.196 0.235 0.264 0.292 
C ) 1000 (×   0.015 0.082 0.144 0.009 0.065 0.120 0.008 0.057 0.106 
z ˆ   120.0 410.0 450.0 420.0 450.0 460.0 450.0 460.0 470.0 
T ˆ   121 110 110 109 110 109 109 109 109 
W ˆ  (×-1)  1.691 31.27 67.94 93.52 127.6 161.2 194.8 225.3 256.3 
0 m   41  14  9 8 7 5 5 4 4 
m ˆ   38  9 5 8 5 4 5 4 3 
Gains from Cooperation 
ΓF  7.422 46.07 84.72 105.8 140.5 175.2 204.1 234.9 265.7 
ΓP  .924 .349 .215 .167 .138 .118 .102 .090 .080 
 
Other Parameters: 
N = 50;  δ = 0.95;  ρ = 0.9;  0 z  = 50.0;   750 = z  